Across Europe, debates about institutional reform are usually framed around efficiency and political stability. In Italy, however, any attempt to reshape the balance of power raises a deeper question: how should institutional change be evaluated in a country where organised crime has historically tried to influence politics and the economy, writes Eriseld Zeneli?

This question has become increasingly relevant as the government led by Giorgia Meloni advances a broader agenda of institutional reforms. Supporters argue that Italy’s political system has long suffered from fragmentation and instability. Strengthening the executive, they say, would provide clearer mandates, more durable governments and greater accountability to voters.

There is some truth in this diagnosis. Since the early 1990s, Italy has experienced frequent political turnover and repeated changes to its electoral laws. The search for stability has been a recurring theme in Italian political debate. Yet the current discussion also raises legitimate concerns about how far institutional reforms should go, particularly when they involve the redistribution of power between the executive and other democratic safeguards.

In democracies, institutional design is never purely technical. The effectiveness of constitutional rules depends heavily on the broader political environment in which they operate. In Italy, that environment has long been shaped by the persistent presence of organised crime.

Groups such as Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra have historically sought influence not only through illicit markets but also through their relationships with political and economic actors. Over decades, Italian institutions have developed complex legal and judicial tools to counter these networks, and significant progress has been made in confronting them. Yet few observers would claim that the problem has disappeared.

This context matters when evaluating proposals that could alter the balance of power within the state. In countries where organised crime has historically attempted to penetrate political systems, democratic resilience often depends on the strength of institutional checks and balances. Concentrating authority in the executive may promise efficiency, but it also requires careful consideration of the safeguards that prevent abuses of power.

For this reason, debates surrounding upcoming institutional changes and referendums in Italy are not merely technical discussions about governance. For many critics, they raise a broader question about democratic prudence: whether reforms aimed at political stability could unintentionally weaken the mechanisms designed to limit power.

Supporters of the reforms argue that such fears are exaggerated. They point out that Italy remains a consolidated democracy, embedded within the institutional framework of the European Union and subject to strong constitutional protections. From this perspective, strengthening the executive could simply align Italy with other European systems where governments operate with clearer mandates and fewer parliamentary constraints.

Yet democratic systems are not judged solely by their formal architecture. They are also shaped by political culture, institutional traditions and historical experience. Italy’s democratic institutions have proven resilient in the face of significant challenges, including terrorism, corruption scandals and organised crime. That resilience has often depended precisely on the existence of multiple centres of institutional control.

The real question, therefore, is not whether institutional reform is legitimate. Democracies regularly update their constitutional arrangements to adapt to changing political realities. Rather, the question is how such reforms interact with the specific vulnerabilities of the political system they are meant to govern.

In Italy’s case, this means recognising an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality: organised crime remains part of the country’s institutional landscape. While its influence should never be overstated, it cannot be ignored when discussing the concentration of political power.

Democratic reforms are most successful when they strengthen both efficiency and accountability. When they prioritise one at the expense of the other, the long-term consequences can be unpredictable. In a country where the integrity of public institutions has often been tested, weakening democratic safeguards in the name of stability risks creating new vulnerabilities rather than resolving old ones.

For European observers, the Italian debate highlights a broader lesson. The strength of democratic institutions across the European Union depends not only on elections, but also on the robustness of the safeguards that limit power and protect the rule of law.

Italy’s democratic institutions have endured many storms. Any reform that reshapes their balance of power should therefore proceed with caution, transparency and a clear awareness of the historical challenges the country continues to face — not only for Italy’s democracy, but for the credibility of democratic governance within Europe as a whole.

Eriseld Zeneli is an EU civil servant, author and writer on European affairs and democratic governance.