In 2013, Valery Gerasimov, the current chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, published an article entitled “The Value of Science in Foresight”. In it, he described modern conflicts as “non-linear”, where non-military means – political, economic, informational – dominate military means by a ratio of 4:1, writes Solomiya Khoma, Head of International Cooperation and the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, Kyiv. 

It is in the war against Ukraine that Russia is trying to adhere to this non-linear strategy to undermine the country’s overall defence capabilities. This can be seen in the political track, Russian speculation in peace talks, attempts to pressure the Ukrainian government by imposing unrealistic demands, and influencing Ukrainian partners. The economic track encompasses the Kremlin’s primary plans to cut off Ukraine’s access to the sea, strike at its energy sector, oil and gas storage facilities, disrupt its logistics, and lobby for its economic interests through political circles in neighbouring countries.

Despite these compounding threats, Ukraine remains resilient and is finding effective countermeasures. But, the information track remains perhaps the main non-military area where Russia exerts its greatest influence.

Russian information operations against Ukraine have been known since 2022, and in fact, throughout the entire period of independence, when the enemy tried to destabilise the country from within. However, their nature has changed significantly with the outbreak of full-scale war: they have ceased to be a secondary tool and have become a full-fledged parallel front, operating continuously, 24 hours a day. This is a perversive ecosystem of Telegram channels, news sites of “doppelgangers”, automated both networks on social media, and artificial intelligence–based content generators.

It is worth highlighting the persistent trend of Russian disinformation using AI. The variety of topics is striking: from videos based on cases of “forced mobilisation” to the Ukrainian army and ironic and sarcastic content aimed at ridiculing the Ukrainian authorities and mobilisation processes, to modelling “virtual” protests that could potentially provoke real protest actions.

Today, the priority for Russians in the Ukrainian information space is to undermine mobilization potential. By discrediting territorial recruitment centres (TRCs) and the mobilisation process in general, Russia can feed the polarisation of society and form a narrative towards the futility of resistance.

It is the TRCs that hostile propaganda has chosen as its main target, because the work of these centres directly ensures the recruitment of units for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the country’s defence capability. Russian information resources systematically fuel citizens’ fears about possible mobilisation and service in the Armed Forces. Such information leaks may be based on real cases of abuse of power by employees of territorial centres, but these are often isolated incidents and are partly provoked by citizens themselves, who violate Ukrainian legislation on the registration of conscripts.

Thanks to bot farms and networks of coordinated accounts, such cases quickly go viral on social media and shape the agenda.

Russian propaganda systematically exploits emotionally charged content, creates provocative videos, exacerbates conflicts between population groups, and multiplies versions of the truth. Such information attacks combine various levels, from discrediting Ukrainian state institutions to instilling the idea of Ukraine’s inevitable defeat and the futility of resistance, and therefore the futility of joining the army.

In Ukraine, hostile outlets exert coordinated pressure by weaponising fear, portraying mobilization into the Armed Forces as inevitable death without any professional military training, bolstered by calls for desertion (promoted as “rational self-defence”) and reinforced by the allegedly great successes of the Russians on the battlefield.

These narratives are designed to influence not only the military and their families, but also everyone who is subject to conscription. There are also attempts to impose the idea of an inevitable change of power through acts of “civil disobedience”.

The goal of these messages is not only to undermine mobilisation capabilities, but also to destroy law and order and erode territorial integrity – chipping away at Ukrainian resistance from within. It is possible that in the near future, coordinated troll networks and influence campaigns will be designed to stimulate and incite “civil resistance” actions.

The Russian strategy follows Gerasimov’s logic: the priority is not to convince, but to paralyse the will to resist, delegitimise the state and mobilisation, and normalise desertion and protests as “rational” behaviour.

The Russians are actively using similar propaganda campaigns in the West, especially in the European information space. In 2023, the French authorities attributed the organisation of the spread of anti-Semitic graffiti with Stars of David in Paris to the Russian special services. According to French investigators, this provocation was intended to stir up tensions and exacerbate already existing social conflicts.

And in 2024, large-scale Russian information operations were recorded in Europe, in particular through the Voice of Europe network in the Czech Republic.

Through it, pro-Russian politicians received funding for promoting anti-Ukrainian narratives aimed not only at undermining support for Kyiv, but also at interfering in the European Union elections. This indicates a systematic attempt by Russia to influence EU political processes and shape a configuration of power in European institutions that is favourable to itself.

Given that Russia’s hybrid operations in the West are only escalating, as is the threat of expanding aggression from Moscow, European leaders must develop an algorithm for effective counteraction. In particular, they should strengthen proactive communication, build robust mechanisms to block destructive content, combat bot networks and get ahead of the increasing dangers of AI content.

Such information countermeasures must become another area of information defence for both Ukraine and Europe. This is critical in both shielding Ukraine’s internal front from destabilization and harming the long-term resilience of European states against the next phase of confrontation.