With Russia consistently hitting targets in Ukraine, exposing limits of Ukrainian air defense, Ukraine has turned to developing its own deep precision strike (DPS) capabilities by modifying its Neptune missile and creating the new Flamingo FP-5 missile that has a 1,150 kilogram warhead. Is Europe going to follow Ukraine’s lead, asks Viktor Szabo?

Faced with the growing Russian threat since Crimea’s annexation in 2014, Europe has worried about how to defend itself against DPS, launching the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and other slowly progressing IAMD (integrated air and missile defense) initiatives. It was only after Russia attacked Ukraine in 2022 that Europe began to focus on building similar offensive capabilities, highlighting them in the seven priorities of the EU’s March 2025 White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

Writing for Bruegel, Alexandr Burilkov and Guntram B. Wolff argue that Europe needs to quickly learn from Ukraine’s experience that drones are widely more efficient as FPV on the front than as deep-strike weapons, that air defense is too expensive and difficult to ensure and that US missile production cannot be relied on. However, they maintain that only modern missiles can provide deterrence from Russian aggression because: “Missiles are far more likely than drones to succeed in destroying targets vital to Russia’s military machine, including command centres, bridges and underground oil, gas and munitions facilities.”

Missile expert Fabian Hoffmann offers the same assessment that Europe needs to “adopt a punishment-based conventional counterstrike strategy” and that “Europe would need to complement existing stocks with hundreds, if not thousands, of long- and deep-strike weapons, while also investing in the necessary storage facilities and logistics.”

The question then begs, what long-range weapons should Europe be producing? And, can they do it?

Long-range, precision missile options

DPS go after a range of high-value targets: mobile and fixed, hardened (bunkers/buried) or not, with most protected by sophisticated IAMD. Recent events have given considerable attention to ballistic missiles in the Red Sea fired by Houthis, in the Middle East fired by Iran against Israel and in Ukraine. In 2024, Iran launched ballistic missiles at Israeli military sites, including the Nevatim air base, but Fabian Hinz says: “Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles demonstrated limited accuracy, restricting their value in counterforce roles.”

Most cases demonstrate that ballistics available in mass because of easily accessible technology and low costs are rarely effective against a well-constructed and well-equipped IAMD system. Normally, despite superior speeds and ranges (up to several thousand kilometers), these missiles suffer from trajectory predictability and lack pinpoint accuracy. Successful ballistic missiles are linked to weak IAMD (as in the Donbas region against Iskander-M missiles) or to highly sophisticated versions such as MaRV missiles with warhead technology similar to nuclear missiles’ which comes at a high cost (in terms of both ownership and effectiveness), making them incompatible with mass production and deployment. Therefore, ballistic missiles, while important for nuclear deterrence, might not be Europe’s best short-term option. ‘Project Nightfall’, launched by Britain in August, aims to develop a cheaper ballistic capability, which could limit its penetration of the most heavily defended targets.

Hypersonic technology, meaning arms (hypersonic ballistic/cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles) travelling at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound) or more, has received a lot of recent attention. Although promising in the long run, many argue the hype is exaggerated as they are not as precise or immune to IAMD as claimed. They are also extremely expensive which makes them currently an unviable choice for Europe. As a report from Ifri argues, the cost “…would doom it to the status of a strategic weapon with an even more limited set of uses.”

Therefore, the current trend is towards a combination of cruise missiles with complementary characteristics: stealth, range, maneuverability, speed and launch environments including sea (surface or submarine), air and land. Their appeal lies in their ability to carry a military payload commensurate with a target’s resilience while outmaneuvering sophisticated defenses. Michael Bohnert, engineer at RAND, argues: “Low-altitude cruise missiles and strikes drones now have a 35-year history of destroyed air defenses, shattered command and control, obliterated munition storages and ruined infrastructure such as power facilities and oil refineries. The combination of high survivability, success, and cost effectiveness will result in cruise missiles and their strike drone counterparts continuing to be the go-to first strike option for the U.S. and other major military powers.”

The parade in Beijing on 3 September, which showcased cruise missiles in the conventional section, is an unambiguous demonstration of this. Possessing a sufficient number of these missiles does not preclude the use of drones to saturate enemy defenses, or occasionally sophisticated and costly ballistic solutions, but the proportion of development efforts must take these factors into account.

Scale-Up European Production

If Europe decides to increase long-range deep strike capabilities with cruise missiles, it better hurry because Russia produces approximately 2,000 cruise missiles annually. Europe’s one long-range option, the sea-launched MdCN first used against Syria in 2018, has had more limited production because before 2022, using such weapons was “strategic” or political to send a message such as “crossing the red line.” Today’s geopolitical context has changed this and mass production of such weapons is now necessary. Ifri notes, “…delivery systems have been procured in limited numbers. It is likely that a weapons delivery system procured in greater numbers would avoid being classed as a strategic weapon and would give the armed forces a broader range of options to respond to growing threats.”

Some countries still turn to the U.S. The Netherlands purchased American Tomahawk missiles for its frigates and Germany is considering it, but this continues reliance on American-controlled technology that might not guarantee missile sovereignty or operational freedom for European users. Plus, service might not be as fast as hoped given Tomahawk delivery time is estimated at 2-3 years and foreign orders are delayed when Washington’s are prioritized.

All this points to Europe’s need to develop and produce its own long-range missiles. Given development costs and the advantage of economies of scale when multiple countries place orders, some governments are already working together on this endeavor through joint initiatives.

This includes the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) program, announced in 2024, uniting France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the UK and Sweden in the pursuit of European-made long-range capabilities of 1,000+ km. Researcher Timothy Wright says there is a particular focus on ground-launched missiles as “no European NATO member except for Turkiye possesses a conventional ground-launched missile with a range greater than 300 kilometres.” He claims a cruise missile design is most likely and MBDA is proposing the Land Cruise Missile (LCM), a ground-launched evolution of its MdCN, as a possibility with a demonstration launch expected by 2028. Poland recently signed a letter of intent with France to cooperate on land-based cruise missiles, but ELSA participants still need to choose a model, place orders and build momentum around the project in order to quickly fill this capability.

Europe’s current missile capabilities are no match for Russia’s and filling this gap might be the only way to deter further Russian aggression as Putin would not want to risk massive deep strikes on infrastructure and high-value targets. To make this possible, Bruegel argues, “Stocks of missiles capable of reaching deep into Russia need to be increased, signaling a crippling cost for Russia in case of any attack on EU territory. European governments should order more from, and become more reliable long-term customers of, European missile producers.”